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This paper assesses the impact of water supply variability on treaty cooperation between international bilateral river basin riparian states. Climate change is anticipated to change the variability of water supply, as well as its expected magnitude. Previous studies have focused mainly on water scarcity, measured in terms of mean precipitation or per capita water availability in the country, as a trigger for conflict or cooperation. The water variability measure used here captures both annual runoff variability and precipitation variability over periods of 30 and 100 years. The analysis used economic and international relations data to identify incentives This paper-a product of the Environment and Energy Team, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the department to mainstream research on climate change. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at bblankespoor@worldbank.org.
for international cooperation in addressing water supply variability. The authors find that small-to-moderate increases in variability create an impetus for cooperation, although large increases in variability would reduce incentives for treaty cooperation. Stronger diplomatic and trade relations support cooperation, while uneven economic power inhibits cooperation. Various measures of democracy/governance suggest different impacts on cooperation across the basin riparians. The findings have policy implications in the context of preparedness for impacts of climate change on the water sector.
Introduction
Scientists are confident now that the "global average net effect of climate since 1750 has been one of warming" (IPCC, 2007:3) , and that "[A]t continental, regional and ocean basin scales, numerous long-term changes in climate have been observed. These include changes in arctic temperatures and ice, widespread changes in precipitation amounts, ocean salinity, wind patterns and aspects of extreme weather including droughts, heavy precipitation, heat waves and the intensity of tropical cyclones" (IPCC, 2007:7) .
The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggests that "Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising of global average sea levels. The 100-year linear trend given in the Third Assessment Report" (IPCC, 2007:1-10 ).
These higher world temperatures are expected to increase the hydrological cycle activity, leading to a change in precipitation patterns and increase in evapotranspiration. More specifically, climate change is expected to increase heat, reduce/increase precipitation, and also increase water supply variability both intra-and inter-annually. "There is high confidence that by mid-century, annual river runoff and water availability are projected to increase at high latitudes (and in some tropical wet areas) and decrease in some dry regions in the mid-latitudes and tropics. There is also high confidence that many semi-arid areas (e.g. Mediterranean basin, western United States, southern Africa and northeast Brazil) will suffer a decrease in water resources due to climate change" (IPCC 2007b:8) . The Fourth Assessment Report further verifies the findings from the Third Assessment Report that states: "One major implication of climate change for agreements between competing users (within a region or upstream versus downstream) is that allocating rights in absolute terms may lead to further disputes in years to come when the total absolute amount of water available may be different." (IPCC, 2001 : Section 4.7.3).
Some studies assert that climate change can lead to conflict between states who share international bodies of water following the likely dwindling water supplies (Gleditsch et al 3 2007 ). On the other hand, several publications suggest that further exacerbation in the water situation may even open the door to new water allocation opportunities between these riparians (ESCAP 1997) , and others (e.g., Dinar S., 2009 and the literature he cites) are more specific, suggesting that water scarcity is actually an impetus for cooperation, following a hill shaped relationship between scarcity and cooperation.
Several economic studies analyze, using a general framework, river sharing agreements with deterministic water flows (Ambec and Sprumont, 2002; Ambec and Ehlers 2008) . The impact of different water availability levels on stability of cooperation is assessed, using different approaches. Beard and McDonald (2007) assess the consistency of water allocation agreements over time if negotiations are held periodically with known river flow prior to the negotiation. Janmatt and Ruijs (2007) , in a stylized model of two regions, wet and arid, suggest that storage could mitigate water scarcity, if upstream and downstream riparian countries find a beneficial allocation to sustain it. They find that the collaboration potential is greater in arid than in wet regions, but that there is little scope for capturing the gains from basin level management if economic integration does not extend beyond water issues. Another work (Ansink and Ruijs, 2008) introduces the effects of climate change on both the efficiency and stability of water allocation agreements in international basins. Using a game theoretic framework it is shown that a decrease in mean flow of a river decreases the stability of an agreement while an increase in variance may have both positive and negative effects on treaty stability.
Others introduce water supply variability into their analysis of specific case studies. Abbink et al. (2005) apply an experimental economics framework to the case of the Syr Darya (Aral Sea Basin) conflict in order to evaluate various governance structures and allocation rules needed for enhanced cooperation among Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan under several water supply regimes. The conclusion reached by Abbink et al. (2009) is that under the tested water availability values and the proposed payoff schemes, it is not likely that cooperation can be reached in that basin.
Existing studies either address the impact of water scarcity on treaty cooperation, or the effects of water variability in the context of a very specific case study. Studies of international water cooperation focus mainly on water scarcity as a trigger for either conflict or cooperation (e.g., Hamner 2008; Dinar S. 2009; Tir and Ackerman, 2009; Hensel and 4 Brochman 2009). As such, various measures of water scarcity, mainly static ones, have been used to assess the emergence of international water treaties and levels of cooperation among riparians. But in order to assess the likely impact of climate change on the stability of existing treaties and on the future likelihood of conflict and cooperation, one may need a water availability measure, such as increased water variability, that can better infer climate change impacts.
Following a series of statements by world leaders in the popular press that worn us of looming wars over water due to increased water scarcity and climate change impact (e.g., BBC Barnaby (2009:283) .
It is, therefore, the Barnaby paper and the sometimes sensationalist water-wars statements, that make-up the general motivation for this paper-to strengthen the scientific basis to our understanding of water-climate change and cooperation/conflict interactions.
In the proceeding sections we introduce water supply variability into a global analysis of treaty formation. Building on existing theories (e.g., Ambec and Dinar A., 2009; Dinar S., 2009 ), a global dataset of bilateral rivers will be used along with several water variability measures, to assess the likelihood of treaty formation, and treaty cooperation, using the range of climate during the years where existing treaties were signed. In a second stage, using various future climate change predictions, the likelihood of additional treaty formation and cooperation is estimated. Section 2 reviews the scientific basis for the climate-hydrology relationship that affects the flow regime in river basins. Section 3 develops the analytical framework. Section 4 reports the data sources and the construction of the various variables. Section 5 discusses the 5 hypotheses. Section 6 presents the empirical models. The results are presented in Section 7, and the paper concludes in Section 8 with suggested policy implications.
Climate, Hydrology, and Flow Regimes in Rivers
The hydrology of river basins is affected by changes in climatic conditions. Anthropogenicinduced climate change is expected to influence water resource cycles significantly. However, the stochastic nature of the changes in the water cycle is uncertain. A useful explanation of the interaction between climate change and the hydrological cycle can be found in Miller and Yates (2005) . They suggest that global climate change is expected to alter the hydrologic cycle by affecting the amount, intensity, and temporal distribution of precipitation. Warmer temperatures will affect the amount of winter precipitation in the form of rain or snow, the amount stored as snow and ice, and its melting dynamics. Long-term climatic trends could trigger vegetation changes that would alter a region's water balance. In forest areas, the combination of warmer temperatures and drying soils caused by snow melting earlier than usual or longer droughts can lead to more frequent and extensive wildfires. When this occurs, land cover and watershed runoff characteristics may change quickly and dramatically as wildfires reduce forest cover and thereby affect the runoff response. Less dramatic, but equally important, changes in runoff can affect transpiration of plants, altered by changes in soil moisture availability, as well as plant responses to elevated CO2 concentrations. In addition, changes in the quantity and quality of water percolating to groundwater will result in changes in aquifer levels and quality, in base flows entering surface streams, and in seepage losses from surface water bodies to the groundwater system (Miller and Yates 2005:37) .
A comprehensive assessment of available water hydrology-climate studies from around the world is provided in IPCC (1996a, b) and IPCC (2001 Specifically, not all river basins are affected by climate in the same way. Differences have been observed both within a given country or even a state. (Miller, Bashford and Strem (2006) , for example, study 6 basins in Central-Northern California. While the trend of the impact of the various future climate scenarios on the 6 water systems is similar, it is evident that the six basins are different in their level of sensitivity to the same expected changes in temperature and precipitation.
A comparison between 5 international river basins (the Nile, Zambezi, Indus, Mekong, and Uruguay) in Riebsame et al. (2002) suggests that basins in drier regions (e.g., Nile, Zambezi) 7 would be most hydrologically-sensitive to the climate change scenarios that were used in the simulation. Hydrological sensitivity of the Indus and Uruguay basins is described as moderate and that of the Mekong is described as low. The adaptation scenarios that have been considered in the basins include mainly investment in larger storage, and adjustments to allocation regimes.
However, because these two adaptation interventions are associated with transboundary property rights, the authors correctly identify that climate change could likely lead to either cooperation or conflict among the basin riparians.
Using simulations, Arora and Boer (2001) analyzed twenty three basins, among them twelve that are international. Applying one climate change scenario they simulated future mean annual discharges and mean annual floods in 2100. Findings suggest that rivers in middle to high latitude are expected to face between +67 and -16 percent change in mean annual discharge and between +68 and -28 percent change in mean annual flood. On the other hand, rivers in tropical and low latitudes are expected to face between +5 and -79 percent change in mean annual discharge and between +26 and -74 percent change in mean annual flow. These findings necessitate a serious consideration of water management adaptation, including a possible adjustment of infrastructure. A recent global study (Palmer et al. 2008 ) evaluated the future (2050, A2 Scenario) impact of climate change on the discharge of major dammed rivers. The findings are in agreement with Arora and Boer (2001) , but much more comprehensive in coverage. They then evaluate a set of river basin management strategies (Bernhardt et al. 2005) to propose a range of interventions that may mitigate future impact of climate change and manmade development on river flow. Climate change is said to affect future river flows by increasing intra and inter-annual variability, and in certain locations to reduce annual means. However, historical records of many river basin flows suggest that significant variability and trends in mean flows have already been observed (Arora et al, 2001; Milly et al. 2005; Palmer et al., 2008; ). This means 8 more 'below average' and more 'above average' precipitation and flow (runoff), which is hard to cope with by riparians that are tied to a given water allocation scheme and existing infrastructure that was designed for a given long-term water flow level. We argue that the various basins in our dataset have already experienced changes in water supply variability (flow, precipitation). Thus, a first stage of analyzing the impact of climate change on the stability of intentional water agreements should focus on observing likely effects of past climate changes on past treaty cooperation. If we can show that water supply variability has affected treaty cooperation in the past 150 years, we would expect that further increase in water supply variability would have similar, or even magnified, effects on treaty cooperation. Therefore, by studying the past changes in climate we will be able to extrapolate predictions how future climates may affect future treaty cooperation. The next section develops the theoretical framework with which we will estimate the impact of change in climate on the likelihood of cooperation among international bilateral river basin riparians.
Theory and Hypotheses
Pairs of countries sign treaties over water bodies they share for various reasons. The economics and international relations literature suggest that they do it because they either face difficulties they cannot overcome themselves; or that they anticipate externalities relating to pollution, flood control, or hydropower, (Just and Netanyahu, 1998) ; or for reasons such as economies of scale where parties anticipate being better off acting in a coalition rather than acting alone when facing certain water scarcity situations (Dinar S., 2009 ).
The economics and international relations literature that applies statistical tools to international water datasets (Brochmann and Hensel, 2009; Espey and Towfique, 2004; Gleditsch et al., 2006; Hensel et al., 2006; Song and Whittington, 2004; Tir and Ackerman, 2009; Toset et al., 2000; Dinar S., 2009 ) has gone a long way already in developing a theory that explains various aspects of shared water and environmental treaty making and we adopt a number of these general variables in our study.
Water variability and cooperation
Overall scarcity (or water availability) has become an important explanatory variable in some of these statistical studies. In particular, Dinar, S. 2009 hypothesizes an inverted U-shaped curve 9 between levels of treaty cooperation and water scarcity. When water is not scarce (abundant) riparian states are in less need to cooperate because they boast a sufficient level of water; as scarcity level increases the impetus for cooperation increases. But as water becomes extremely scarce, there is very little to cooperate over and thus formalized treaty formation becomes less likely (Dinar S. 2009 , and the literature he cites).
We believe a similar curvilinear relationship may be made in relation to water variability, as the low end of the distribution (low variability) is associated with lower damages and the high end of the distribution (high variability) is associated with significant damages (from droughts and floods, respectively). Consequently, riparians in these situations are hypothesized to exhibit less incidence of cooperation. Cooperation can be reflected in signing new treaties in cases where they do not exist; in more treaties to amend the initial set of agreements; or in new treaties introducing more issues (such as water quantity, hydropower, pollution, and flood control) into the cooperative framework. We use two climatic variables that affect water scarcity, namely basin-level precipitation variability and basin-level runoff variability.
An empirical observation of the mean versus the variability of both precipitation and runoff further strengthens our claim. We find in our data that higher variation is correlated with lower means (R In particular, domestic institutions may play a major role in either facilitating or inhibiting international cooperation. Political, legal, and economic institutions sustain the functioning of the state both domestically and internationally. They reflect the state's ability to enter into, and honor, an agreement, which may require financial investments and costs (Congleton, 1992:412-413) . Countries that are more institutionally advanced may in turn have 10 little interest in cooperative ventures with countries having weaker and unstable institutions.
Similarly, investments are not secure and property rights poorly defined in unstable countries characterized by political turmoil (Deacon, 1994) . It is hypothesized therefore that the higher the level of institutionalization and governance (e.g., an effective domestic government) among the riparians, the more a water agreement is likely to be facilitated.
Trade and overall country relations
The literature has also considered other interactions such as trade and the extent of diplomatic ties among the states as additional variables for explaining the emergence or failure of treaty cooperation. By some accounts the more countries trade the higher the level of their interdependence and the higher the likelihood of treaty formation (Polachek 1980 (Polachek , 1987 . Janmatt and Ruijs (2007) argue that there is little scope for capturing the gains from basin level management if economic integration does not extend beyond water issues. A history of diplomatic ties and good relations are, therefore, expected to express overall good country relations and increase treaty likelihood (Yoffe et. al. 2003) .
Power asymmetries
The international relations literature has entertained power asymmetry as possibly facilitating cooperation (Lowi 1993). Other works have argued that power asymmetry is not necessarily a pre-requisite for cooperation although if asymmetry does exist the hegemon often plays a benign role by facilitating inter-state coordination through incentives (Young 1994; Barrett 2003) .
Consequently, while brute power may not be relevant for analyzing inter-state cooperation in the case of the environment, the different abilities of countries to provide such incentives as financial transfers or side-payments may be important. Other studies (Just and Netanyahu, 1998:9; Hijri and Grey, 1998: 89) claim that power asymmetries generally impede cooperation. First, a power balance may reflect a type of equality in the sense that a weaker party does not believe it will be taken advantage of by the stronger party, reducing trust issues (Rubin and Brown, 1975:213-233) . Second, the more powerful state does not fill obliged to provide costly incentives to encourage the weaker state to cooperate (Bennett, Ragland and Yolles, 1998:63-66) . Our economic power variable, measuring the ratio between the more economically powerful and the less powerful riparian is hypothesized to negatively affect treaty cooperation.
11
Geography Certain riverine geographical configurations have been said to facilitate conflict while other have been said to be more conducive to cooperation. The literature has argued that the more asymmetric the river geography the harder it is to achieve cooperation (LeMarquand 1977; Haftendorn 2000) . This is notoriously most common in upstream-downstream situations. In opposition, the more symmetric the river geography (i.e. the more retaliation is internalized to the river system), the less feasible conflict becomes. In other words, the more the river straddles the international boundary the more conducive such a typology may be for inter-state coordination over the river (Toset et. al 2000) .
Data and Variables
Based on the literature reviewed earlier, we divide our data construction efforts into two parts.
We focus first on data and variables that represent water supply variability in a basin. At a second stage we discuss the data and variables that represent the international relations, economic, political and institutional situation in the basin countries, and the basin geography. Iran. In a few cases, the publicly available data on river mouth locations were insufficient and experts from the region were consulted to verify the locations (e.g., AL-Jabbari, 2009).
Runoff data by basin and country-basin
The Global Runoff Data Center (GRDC) provided flow data for stations within international river basins (http://www.bafg.de/GRDC/EN/Home/homepage__node.html). The distribution of the GRDC data availability is not uniform across the world. Also, the temporal distribution varies widely. With additional data requirements such as 12 monthly observations per year and at least 5 years of observations, we ended up with 98 basin observations only (compared with the 224 basins in our dataset). Therefore, we could not use the GRDC data.
We turned to another alternative. Monthly runoff data over a thirty year period ) was taken from a stand-alone hydrologic model CLIRUN-II (Strzepek et al., 2008) 
Precipitation data
Precipitation data are available from Mitchell and Jones (2005) 
Water variability variables
We were able to construct several sets of water variability variables for precipitation and for runoff. While our data allows calculation of precipitation at country-basin and at basin levels, the runoff variables could be calculated only at basin level. Technically, it is possible given the caveat that the country-basin will further split up the total area and will likely lessen the number of model observation(s) per basin-country. This reduction in observations gives room to a larger potential error and a lesser likelihood of actual gauge station observations in the basin for the model. We constructed the following variables: Mean precipitation for country1/basinj 14 Data on economic, political and international relations We use several sources to construct our economic, political, geography, and international relations variables. We will explain the processes we used in order to calculate each of these variables in the context of a basin/country or in the context of a basin (containing the area of the basin for the two riparians).
Democracy and governance
We employ 4 variables that measure level of democracy and governance in a country, using data from Neumayer (2002a:145-146 Variables in the democracy and governance categories are expressed as indexes or as dummies and are calculated for each country in the basin. We expect that some of the democracy variables and the governance variables are correlated somehow due to the nature of the specification of several of the democracy variable (political rights and civil liberties; governance quality). Therefore, we will not use democracy and governance as independent variables in the same equation.
Trade and diplomatic ties
These variables pertain to two riparian states in each basin and thus they are calculated as basin- Table 2 ), although differences do not exceed 10%. We constructed separate trade variables based on both the IMF and UN datasets. We converted the trade values in these two datasets into constant 1999 US$ (for IMFDOT) and 2002 US$ (for COMTRADE).
We then use annual country-level GDP data from the GGDC&CB (2005) Since our unit of observation is the river, we construct the trade variable for the entire dyad. As was indicated in our analytical framework, one riparian may be more interested in signing a treaty than the other. However, the outcome (as we measure it) doesn't reveal which riparian initiated the water treaty and, thus, our trade variables measure the dyadic trade volume rather than that of each riparian state.
Diplomatic Relations
We use the Correlates of War (COW) dataset (Diplomatic Exchange (v2006.1)) for the construction of the Diplomatic relations variable. Data on diplomatic relations is available for the period 1817-2005. We capture whether either riparian had representation in the other country in a given year. In this case we assigned a value of 1 to this year. Diplomatic relations is then calculated by dividing the number of years for which any representation was recorded by the total number of years for which data is available. The resulting variable, Diplomatic relations, is then bounded between [0, 1].
Power asymmetries
To reflect the economic and welfare asymmetry discussed above, we use annual country-level GDP data (state level data) from the GGDC&CB (2005) The ratio between the values of the riparians is the basis for the power asymmetry in the basin.
The former is a measure of overall power (Economic power) while the latter is a measure of wealth (Welfare power). The two variables were constructed by dividing the value of the wealthier, or the more economically powerful riparian by the value of the less powerful riparian.
Therefore, the value is always greater or equal to 1; the higher the value, the greater the power asymmetry. In our analysis we use only the variable Economic power per the justification provided in the theory section.
Geography
We use the 14 geographical configurations identified in Dinar S., (2008) . These configurations were re-categorized into three groups, capturing the rivers that fall under the 'through-border' geography-or the most asymmetric of the river geographies-and the rivers that fall under the 'border-creator' geography-or the most symmetric of the river geographies. The remaining rivers that fall under the other configurations were included under 'other' geography, whereby this category served as the benchmark. The reasons for this regrouping are as follows: (1) the distorted distribution of the 14 categories doesn't allow the estimated regression model to be fully ranked, and (2) we are mostly interested in the impact of the two extreme geographies and their ability to explain interactions between riparian states. In fact, all the other geographies have some combination of spatial asymmetry and symmetry so ranking them would be quite impossible.
Treaty data
The treaty dataset is retrieved from several depositories and includes 226 country dyad observations. 
Empirical Framework
The underlying empirical assumption in our analytical framework is that water variability is embedded in the basin history and may increase in the future. Past water variability, as well as concerns regarding future variability of water, affect regional relationships. For example, although some disasters caused by floods or droughts vi may encourage states to engage in joint mitigation efforts, we claim that it is the long-term variability that leads to enduring cooperation, codified in an agreement, between river riparians.
Based on the theory developed above, long-term cooperation among riparian states can be expressed by the following relationship
That is, cooperation, measured through treaty relations, is a function of a vector of water supply variability (V ) and of other variables ( X ). The vector X includes democracy and governance variables, the states' overall relations (including diplomatic ties, and trade), variables measuring power asymmetry, and physical geographical setting. In the next section we provide several alternative empirical specifications for level of cooperation and for water supply variability.
Applying the framework
We analyze bilateral river basins. The unit of observation in our analytical framework is the river (Treaties are signed sometimes for certain tributaries rather for the entire basin).
Cooperation between the two riparian states takes place if a treaty (or treaties) exist(s). Some of the earlier treaties in our database may no longer be in force for a variety of reasons. However, 19 because our approach considers water variability as a long-term phenomenon and since we argue that agreements are a response to such variability we are interested in all treaty observations throughout time. We assume that while water-related issues among the riparians are interrelated and their resolution may affect each other, all are basically driven by water variability.
Measuring treaty cooperation
Two proposed expressions for C will be based on a cooperation relationship explaining treaty formation. Our first cooperation expression, P(C) in (4), assesses the likelihood of a treaty on any of the issues in the basin, regardless of the issue, the riparian state that faces water variability, or the period the treaty was signed. 
A second cooperation expression, N(C) in (5), is a simple arithmetic count of the number of treaties signed between the two riparian states on any issue or issues over the years. We acknowledge that cooperation may have aspects other than the nominal count of treaties existence or number of treaties. The reader is referred to the justification of using number of treaties to Dinar S. (2009) .
where T t is the number of treaties in year t. We apply the model in (5) to the set that includes all rivers without and with treaties (0, 1, 2, …, N).
Empirical specifications, functional forms and estimation issues
The empirical specifications of the various expressions to be estimated are as follows:
Treaty/no-treaty =f 1 (.) To sum, our general basin-level treaty cooperation model takes the form: 
where  is the error term and each variable is represented by the various measurements discussed above.
We cannot avoid addressing possible endogeneity related to modeling the relationship between trade and cooperation (Timpone, 2003) . One concern is that both trade and cooperation, among the river basin riparians, might be endogenously determined in an interdependent relationship and thus, if specified in a single equation, may lead to a biased estimation. By considering trade as a long term activity among the riparians, our theory suggests that trade is determined outside of the model and is uncorrelated with the error term of the equation.
Therefore, we can use trade as an independent variable in our single model estimates.
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Results
We applied the analytical framework in the case of two climatic phenomena, namely basin variability of precipitation and basin variability of runoff. Descriptive statistics of the variables discussed and used in the paper are presented in Appendix 2.
We report separately the results for the basin precipitation variability and for the basin runoff variability. One important caveat we should address upfront is that our analysis at this stage doesn't account for water regulation in the rivers in our sample. While the IPCC (2001:Section 4.3.6.1) suggests that "…Runoff tends to increase where precipitation has increased and decrease where it has fallen over the past few years," it is important to note that dams may skew the runoff pattern. However, we found an empirically positive correlation .860) among the two riparians. Therefore, we will use only the basin level variable CVPb. This high correlation suggests that even in very large river basins in our sample, the climate characteristics are similar across the basin territories of the two riparians. Another explanation is that the model data was created from limited meteorological / runoff observations in certain geographic areas (e.g. Africa) and does not have high variance.
Basin precipitation and runoff estimates
We first present results of an analysis that estimated whether or not the basin precipitation variability itself and basin runoff itself can explain cooperation. Table 1 contains 3 equations.
Equation (1) includes the basin precipitation variation while equations (2) and (3) (1) and (3)), the Maddala R 2 is 0.284 and 0.295 respectively) we will improve the overall explanation of the GLM estimates by adding several control variables. Tables 2 and 3 introduce control variables that improve the level of explanation while keeping the significance of the results intact.
viii Table 2 presents the results of the Logistic runs, estimating the likelihood of forming a treaty. Equations (1)- (3) pertain to the precipitation variability where as equations (4)- (6) However, it is significant in all regressions with precipitation ( (1)- (4)), and only in two ( (6), (8)) of the four equations with runoff. The Economic Power coefficient is both significant and has the expected sign in all 8 equations. In terms of overall equation fit, the GLM estimates ( (1), (2), (5), (6)) have a Maddala R 2 in the range of 0.32-0.37. And the POISON estimates ( (3), (4), (7), (8) Geography, an important variable in the study of international water, did not provide significant results in any of the estimates. This is against expectations, although several previous studies reviewed earlier suggest similar results. A possible explanation for this performance of the geography variable is that the runoff variability already captures the geography embedded in the river basin, and that precipitation distribution between the two riparians is independent of the geography of the river. The high correlation that was found between the precipitation falling on the basin area in country 1 and that in country 2, irrespective of the geography of the river could support the insignificance of the Geography coefficients.
Trade is the most robust variable in the analysis and was significant with the expected signs in all regressions. As noted, trade has a hill shaped impact on cooperation. 
Marginal impacts
Calculations of marginal impacts of the main variables on treaty cooperation are presented in Table 4 . We present results for regression estimates from Table 3 only. Values in panels (1)- (4) are for estimates with precipitation and values in panels (5)- (8) are for estimates with runoff.
The interpretation of the coefficients is as follows: An increase of 1 millimeter per year in long-term annual precipitation will lead to an increase of between 1-2 treaties. An increase in the long-term runoff of 1 m 3 /s will lead to an increase of between 3-5 treaties. An increase in the trade importance, measured as the ratio between trade and GDP of the basin states, in 1 percent, will lead to an increase of between 1-14 treaties. An increase in the status of diplomatic ties between the riparian states will lead to an increase of between 1-3 treaties. And an increase of 1 percent in the ratio of economic power between the basin states will lead to a very small decrease in the number of treaties signed.
Conclusions, Policy Implications, and Future Research
Views in the extant literature, including the IPCC, raise concerns that "One major implication of climate change for agreements between competing users (within a region or upstream versus downstream) is that allocating rights in absolute terms may lead to further disputes in years to come when the total absolute amount of water available may be different." (IPCC, 2001 
